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ABSTRACT: Using Riemann’s Rearrangement Theorem, Øystein Linnebo (2020) argues that, if it were 
possible to apply an infinite positive weight and an infinite negative weight to a working scale, the 
resulting net weight could end up being any real number, depending on the procedure by which 
these weights are applied. Appealing to the First Postulate of Archimedes’ treatise on balance, I argue 
instead that the scale would always read 0 kg. Along the way, we stop to consider an infinitely jittery 
flea, an infinitely protracted border conflict, and an infinitely electric glass rod.
Imagine a perfectly symmetric balance scale in a uniform gravitational field, with a qualitatively 
identical object placed in each pan of the scale, at equal distances from the centre. Would this balance 
lean to the left, or would it lean to the right? Neither, you say: the two objects weigh the same, so there 
should be equilibrium. The situation is totally symmetric, so there is nothing to incline the balance in 
one direction over the other. Would it change your answer if I told you that the two identical weights 
are both infinitely heavy, and that the parts of the balance are made of an unbreakable, unbendable 
material? Although we are now in the realm of science fiction, it seems like it should not make a 
difference: the situation remains perfectly symmetric, after all.
The first postulate of Archimedes’ On the Equilibrium of Planes has it that on a balance, “equal weights 
at equal distances are in equilibrium” (Heath 1897, p. 189). There is no restriction to finite weights –– 
nor should there be, if the intuition just articulated is sound. Generalising slightly from this postulate, 
so that it applies to spring as well as balance scales, we get the following principle:
Balance Principle. When equal weights and counterweights are applied to a scale, the 
scale is in the same state as when no weights are applied to it.
In the case of a spring scale, the counterweights can be understood as upward “pulls” or negative 
weights on the scale, like helium balloons. The aim of this note is to defend the Balance Principle, in its 
general form, from an elegant thought experiment Øystein Linnebo proposed in this journal.
Imagine an infinite stock of brass weights of 1 kg, ⅓ kg, ⅕ kg, and so on; and an infinite stock of 
counterweights of ½ kg, ¼ kg, ⅙ kg, and so on. At 1pm, we begin alternately placing a weight on the 
left of our indestructible balance, and a counterweight on the right. We start with the biggest weights 
and work our way down. Or, as in Linnebo’s version of the story, we alternately apply a weight and 
attach a balloon to a spring scale. We speed up the steps as we go, so that at 2pm exactly, all steps have 
been performed. Which way will the balance lean after 2pm? And what will the spring scale indicate?
Since, at 2pm, we have amassed both an infinite weight and an infinite counterweight,2 the Balance 
Principle predicts that the balance reaches equilibrium, and that the spring scale will point to 0 kg. 
Linnebo disagrees with that prediction. He points out that, as weights and counterweights are added 
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Linnebo concludes that, at 2pm, the weights outweigh the counterweights by exactly ln(2) kg. So the 
balance scale will tilt left, and the spring scale will indicate 0.69 kg rather than 0 kg –– contrary to the 
Balance Principle. As Linnebo observes, this way of calculating the net weight has bizarre 
consequences. For by Riemann’s Rearrangement theorem, the limit of this conditionally convergent 
series depends on the order of the terms –– in fact, a suitable shuffle can yield any real value 
whatsoever. So if Linnebo is right, the net weight pressing on the scale is not a function of what is 
presently on the scale, in cases like these. Instead, it is determined by the order in which the various 
items were added to the scale. Thus, writes Linnebo, the possibility of an actual infinity of weights and 
counterweights appears to imply “a dramatic departure from physics as we know it.”2
It seems to me, however, that these conclusions are the product of a kind of mathematical illusion. It is 
true that the total weight and counterweight on the balance differ at all times prior to 2pm, and also 
that this weight difference converges to a positive value. But it does not follow that the difference 
attains its limit value, or indeed persists at all (cf. Benacerraf 1962). After all, the total weight and 
counterweight end up equal –– such are the peculiarities of infinite arithmetic. To make this visual, 
imagine that the incremental weights we place on the balance are brass cylinders of uniform density 
and diameter, with varying heights. As we stack these cylinders neatly on top of one another, the stack 
on each pan grows taller and taller, with its height in inches matching its weight in kilograms. At all 
stages prior to 2pm, the left tower is a bit ahead of the one on the right: it is a bit over half an inch 
taller and a bit over half a kilo heavier. Nonetheless, at 2pm two infinitely tall brass cylinders will have 
been completed, which do not differ in weight any more than they differ in height. If we were to fuse 
the segments at each stage, the two brass towers could even be qualitatively identical in all respects.
Linnebo’s treatment of the case makes tacit appeal to something like the following principle:
Continuity Principle. If a certain natural quantity converges to a particular limit value l 
over the course of a certain time interval [ t0, t1 ), and nothing further happens to affect its 
value at t1, then the quantity in question attains the limit value l at t1.
This assumption is natural enough –– as far as I know, there are no counterexamples to it in nature. 
But then, there are no supertasks in nature either –– no infinite-step procedures that are completed in 
finite time. I submit that, in the presence of supertasks, the Continuity Principle fails for independent 
reasons. I just gave a counterexample: the height difference between the two brass cylinders vanishes 
instantaneously at 2pm. For another counterexample, consider what happens when we empty an 
infinite sack of numbered apples, one by one. When the task is completed, there is nothing left in the 
sack. But at all times prior to completion, the number of apples remaining is infinite. Thus the number 
of apples in the sack drops instantaneously from infinity to zero.3
Could there be a restricted version of the Continuity Principle that avoids such counterexamples, 
while still sustaining Linnebo’s reasoning? I think not: the principle has absurd consequences even 
when it is applied only to the spring scale of Linnebo’s original scenario. To see this, consider what 
 By an “infinite weight,” I mean a countably infinite weight. I will not consider the possibility of even greater, 2
uncountable weights (if, indeed, it is a possibility). Likewise for infinite heights and other infinite quantities.
 A similar discontinuity occurs in the Ross-Littlewood paradox (Allis and Koetsier 1991). Begin with an empty 3
urn. At the nth step of the supertask, add ten balls numbered (10n – 9) up to 10n, and remove ball number n. 
Though the total number of balls in the urn approaches infinity, no ball survives until the end. 
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would happen on this picture when, having alternately applied all the weights and counterweights to 
the scale in the manner described, we now remove a weight from the scale –– for instance the ⅕ kg 
weight. On Linnebo’s picture, this weight makes an essential contribution to the reading on the scale 
after 2pm: without it, the net weight in kilos would have converged to ln(2) – ⅕. Since this weight 
continues to depress the scale, the net weight on the scale should go down by ⅕ kg as soon as it is 
removed.  The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of the other component weights and counterweights.4
So far, so good. But now imagine that we sequentially removed all the weights and counterweights 
from the scale between 2pm and 3pm. Moreover, suppose we proceed in a slightly different order, 
releasing two counterweights after each positive weight, instead of only one. Without discontinuity, 
the scale pointer will then indicate the following value after 3pm: 5
But that would be absurd! At 3pm all weights and counterweights have been removed, and there is 
nothing left on the scale. Clearly the net weight is then 0 kg, and not 0.35 kg. So not even a highly 
restricted version of the Continuity Principle can hold true in this context.
Linnebo is right that Riemann’s Rearrangement theorem can teach us a lesson about supertasks. But 
the lesson is not that such tasks are metaphysically impossible, or that they are inconsistent with such 
fundamental physical precepts as the Balance Principle. Rather, it is that convergence to a limit is at 
best a highly defeasible heuristic for predicting the result of a supertask, because the Continuity 
Principle cannot be trusted in this context.
It is natural to ask how this lesson should affect our assessment of other “conditionally convergent” 
supertasks, involving other quantities. For example, Linnebo describes the case of a flea on a real 
number line. The flea starts its infinite journey at 0. Then it hops one inch to the right to land on 1, 
then ½  inch back to the left, ⅓  inch to the right and so on. Where does Linnebo’s flea end up? 
Alternatively, imagine an infinite territorial negotiation. The Kingdom of Annexia acquires 1 square 
mile from its neighbour in return for a different, ½ mi2 patch, then acquires ⅓ mi2 in exchange for ¼ 
mi2, etcetera. How much territory does Annexia gain? Or suppose we used a silk cloth to rub off some 
electrons from a glass rod, until the rod achieves a positive charge of 1  coulomb. Next we let –
 ½ coulomb of electrons flow back into the rod, then rub off another ⅓ coulomb, and so on. What is the 
charge in the rod when all steps have been completed?
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 By contrast, the Balance Principle predicts that no component weight or counterweight individually makes an 4
essential contribution to the final net weight, since each one is only finite. So on the picture I advocate, the spring 
scale would stay balanced at 0 kg if any individual weight or balloon were removed.
 To see that the sum of the removed weights converges to ½ ln(2), note that:5
The top row is the familiar identity  with zeroes interspersed at regular intervals. The middle 
row is the result of multiplying all terms of that identity by –½, and interspersing zeroes. The final row is 
obtained by adding the first two together.
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One upshot of our discussion is that we cannot uncritically apply the Continuity Principle in these 
other cases either. Might a generalised Balance Principle supply the answers instead? I suspect not. 
These supertasks are in fact much more diverse than meets the eye, and in my estimation the answer 
is different in each case. For instance, the outcome of Annexia’s land swaps turns on a legal 
complication: who owns the areas that are swapped back and forth ad infinitum, and consequently 
have no final claimant? What we can say about Linnebo’s flea depends on the generality of the locality 
principle in physics. And the analysis of the glass rod example raises a metaphysical issue about the 
individuation of particular electrons as they enter and exit the rod.6
Thus each supertask raises its own, subject-specific set of questions. No single, unified principle could 
possibly settle all the varied physical, philosophical and even legal issues that can arise. Hence I will 
not propose a generalised, catch-all replacement for the Continuity Principle. Instead, I incline to a 
kind of particularism about supertasks. My aim in this paper was to defend the Balance Principle as it 
applies to Linnebo’s infinite scale and balance. As for other supertasks, I am afraid there just is no 
general answer. Supertasks resist generalisation, and there is no shortcut to carefully considering each 
one on its own terms –– that is the bad news. But the good news is that we need not abandon our most 
basic physical precepts and intuitions in forming those predictions. In particular, Archimedes’ balance 
postulate withstands Linnebo’s ingenious challenge.
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 To elaborate, here are my tentative two cents about each of these three supertasks:6
The Flea. Note a crucial disanalogy with Linnebo’s scale. While the scale has infinite weights and counterweights 
pressing on it, there are no synchronous constraints at all on the location of the flea. That means the only thing 
that could settle the flea’s end point is the infinite winding path it takes to get there. In my view, this makes it 
unsurprising that the flea’s end point depends on its path, and so on the order of its jumps. So in this case, I find 
Linnebo’s prediction quite plausible, viz. that the flea ends up at ln(2) ≈ 0.69 inch. Any alternative would involve 
teleportation, a violation of the cherished locality principle. This makes it reasonable to maintain the continuity of 
locomotion where possible, even if the more general Continuity Principle is abandoned.
Annexia. The final area of Annexia is a function of the particular regions that end up under Annexian control. 
Within the given parameters, Annexia could end up with 0.69 mi2 of additional territory: this happens if the 
trades involve an ever-shrinking border region between the two nations, so that almost every location has a final 
claimant. But that optimal outcome is not at all guaranteed. If the swaps are more disparate, there could be large 
areas that are traded back and forth indefinitely, without a final claimant. Suppose ownership of those areas 
remains unsettled. Then, far from gaining any land, Annexia could be left without a settled claim to any territory 
at all, provided its neighbour is strategic enough to organise the swaps in a suitable way.
The Rod. The positive charge of the rod is generated by the electron deficit in the rod (or, if you prefer, by the 
proton surplus). After the first step, the rod has an electron deficit of 1 coulomb. That deficit is subsequently 
compensated in part by electrons added later in the process. But how many of those compensating electrons last 
until the end? Assuming it makes sense to re-identify token electrons (cf. Huggett 1999), the answer depends on 
which individual electrons are removed at each step. For suppose the electrons exit the rod in the same order as 
they entered. Then each electron that enters the rod during this supertask will be removed at some later step. 
Consequently, the charge in the rod will then be 1  coulomb or greater at the end of the task, since nothing 
remains to compensate the initial deficit. Alternatively, it could be that some number of newly added electrons 
do stick around, which could lead to any intermediate outcome between 0.69 and 1 coulomb.
